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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States' relationships with its
trading partners have been strained as a result of the extraterritorial application
of American antitrust laws.' Generally, foreign nations perceive that the reach
of United States antitrust jurisdiction is excessively broad, and that it represents
a threat to their territorial sovereignty. In specific cases, the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws presents a severe conflict with the laws,
policies and goals of the foreign government. To be sure, when the United
States attempts to regulate transactions ordinarily subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, it only seeks to ensure that policies which are
strictly enforced in its domestic legal order not be thwarted from abroad. Still,
other nations believe just as passionately that their national policies should not
be undermined by American actions.2 They consider it fundamentally unfair
that its citizens may be found in violation of U.S. laws, possibly even subject
to criminal prosecution, as a result of conduct which is perfectly legal under
their own national laws. Indeed, U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction
remove from the foreign sovereign its ability to control the activities of its own
citizens within its own borders and, as such, constitute a violation of the foreign
nation's territorial sovereignty. 3
The territoriality principle is the benchmark against which all other
jurisdictional principles are measured. It delimits the bounds of a state's
authority and distributes competence to rule among the various world actors.4
Under the principle's latter role, international transactions are controlled under
the theory that a state's bonafide interests in regulating its own territory will be
respected by other nations. 5 It is precisely this concept of reciprocity that
undergirds the exercise of state power.6 In order for international transactions
to flourish, a reliable system of international law must be in place. Any system
which allows a single nation to exert pressure on a foreign entity to act, or
refrain from acting, in a manner inconsistent-with its own laws, policies, and
interests will inevitably harm this needed international system.7 The legislative

I Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1978);
1 FUOATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 74-78 (3d ed. 1982); NEALE,
ANT'RUST LAWS OF THE USA (2d ed. 1970); 1 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERIcAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 4.01-.18 (2d ed. 1981).
2

Schreiber, The ProperReach of TerritorialJurisdiction:A Case Study of DivergentAttitudes,
2 (Supp. 2) GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 50 (1972).
3

1d. at 51.

4 See
5

Maier, supra note 1.

d. at 585.

6 See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS

1 See Maier, supra note 1, at 586;
1982, at 16.

§ 33 (1883).

When the Pipeline Row is Over, The Economist, Oct. 30,
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and judicial branches of the United States government, however, are of the firm
opinion that in some areas, most notably antitrust, the interests of the United
States are important enough to annul the territoriality principle. Broadly stated,
the issue is whether the United States goes too far in attempting to enforce
policies which its deems vital to its national interests, and whether, in doing so,
the United States violates international law.'
The two reasons generally given to justify the extraterritorial application
of a nation's domestic laws are the "effects doctrine" and the nationality
principle.9 Almost all states acknowledge the nationality principle as a rule of
international law, even though substantial disagreement exists as to its precise
application."0 Use of the effects doctrine, however, has not been universally
accepted. The effects doctrine is not only the least recognized of all
internationally sanctioned principles of transnational jurisdiction, but is also the
principle that has generated the rfmost contention in the international arena. I
'Generally, foreign reactions to assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction have
centered around the invocation of the "effects doctrine," under which the United
States claims extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign activities which have a
direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on American commerce.' Reactions
on the part of foreign governments, such as blocking statutes, complaints over
specific assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and antisuit injunctions,
illustrate the extent to which they perceive that the doctrine, as applied by the
United States, violates international law. And such perception is not far from
the truth. International law is a field concerned with policy. Part of this policy
is to limit the authority and actions of states. The simple fact that a United
States court chooses to uphold the applicability of the effects doctrine does not
signify that the doctrine has become acceptable under international law. On the
contrary, by using the effects doctrine to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, U.S. courts act outside the boundaries of ifiternational law,
regardless of what the domestic law and policy involved might implicate.
Indeed, it is a well-settled principle of international law that "a sovereign cannot
be permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim by a
foreign sovereign for a wrong done to the latter's subject. ""3

8

See Schreiber, supra note 2.

9 Growing Incidence of Extraterritoriality Threatens International Business, ICC Says,
International Trade Reporter (BNA), Sept. 30, 1987, at 88.
to Id.

11See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 31-32 (1979).
32 15

U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).

11United States v. Guatemala, 1982 DEPT. OF STATE ARB. 851, 876-77 (Ser. 3).
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It should not be surprising, then, that when a nation attempts to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction, considerable international tensions are created, for
the nations affected regard such an attempt as a direct violation of their national
sovereignty. 4 For instance, an attempt to force a corporation to conform to
a forum's national laws will invariably lead to an international dispute, as it is
very possible that a practice which the forum has a policy of prohibiting is a
practice which a corporation's home-state protects, and possibly encourages or
compels."5 Any claim by a nation to export its antitrust legislation is therefore
bound to conflict with the foreign government's legal and economic policy,
especially when the allegedly illegal practice is required by the foreign
government. 16 Because of this, laws which are intended to be "true and fair"
in the domestic legal order are severely criticized abroad as being distortive of
trade practices. 7 In fact, the British House of Lords has characterized it as
"axiomatic" that, in antitrust matters, what one nation seeks to defend may be
what it is the policy of another nation to attack.' 8 It is no accident that in the
case of the United States, the nation most often accused of impermissibly
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, there have been five diplomatic protests
against such exercise of jurisdiction for every single instance of express
diplomatic support. Moreover, for every cooperation agreement, three blocking
statutes have emerged.' 9
In essence, foreign nations see two problems with United States antitrust
laws: (1) the substance of the laws, and (2) the reach of the laws. This article
will deal primarily with the latter, but the former will also be addressed as the
two problems often intertwine. Many nations perceive the substance of the laws
as a problem, because while the United States confidently relies on competition
to regulate its market, other smaller nations feel that a more regulated economy
is more appropriate to their economic needs. 2" It is this fundamental difference
on market organization and economic policy that is at the heart of the dispute
over extraterritorial jurisdiction. A nation is rightfully offended when it finds

14C.P. Rogers, Still Running Against the Wind: A Comment on Antitrust JurisdictionandLaker

Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 50 J. AIR L.

AND

CoMM. 931, 932 (1985).

5

' See Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, [19781 A.C. 547, 617.
tSNote, In Re JapaneseElectronicproductsAntitrust Litigation: Sovereign Compulsion, Act of
State, and the ExtraterritorialReach of the united States Antitrust Laws, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 721
(1987).
17See Pettit & Styles, The InternationalResponse to ExtraterritorialApplication
of United States
Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982).
IS See Rio Tinto Zinc, supra note 15, at 617.
"' Pettit and Styles, supra note 17, at 699.
'0 Shenefield, Thoughts on ExtraterritorialApplication of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 354 (1983).
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that its choice on market organization is imperilled, possibly nullified, by the
choices made by a foreign government in organizing its own market.2"
This article seeks to provide viable alternatives to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws. To this end, Part II begins by focusing on the
reach of U.S. antitrust laws and disciisses the U.S. viewpoint on extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Part III examines the problems that arise from the U.S. exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law. Part IV surveys the
reactions of various nations to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
the measures they have taken in attempting to curb these expansive U.S.
tendencies. Finally, Part V provides several suggestions as to how the United
States could avoid, or perhaps minimize, the disruptive conflicts caused by its
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
II. THE VIEWPOINT OF THE UNITED STATES

The main concern of any state enacting antitrust or competition laws is to
protect its economic interests. Within this area, the United States has legitimate
concerns. The American economy is based on free trade and free competition.
The United States has a right to protect this economy from foreign
encroachment. U.S. firms are no less injured when the harm comes from a
foreign nation than when it does from the U.S. itself. Significant problems
arise, however, when the reach of that protection exceeds the territorial
boundaries of the United States. In essence, the United States is of the opinion
that there is little or no international law on the subject of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Thus, it believes that while there may be a question of comity or
a need to consult on occasion, there is no obligation to refrain from taking any
measures necessary to enforce United States law. If the United States decides
that an entity has violated American law, and can gain jurisdicion over that
entity under United States law, the question for the court .becomes one of
appropriateness, not one of ability. Whether such jurisdiction is extraterritorial
is of little consequence to the court's ultimate decision.
The United States position is grounded on the decision in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).'2 Although the decision purports to
conform with international law, it rests only on Judge Hand's personal view of
international law, namely that, "[I]t is settled law ... that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends..
,
•~
Having established the effects doctrine as a general basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Alcoa Court went on to distinguish between

21 Id.

at 354.

1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3

Id. at 443.
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"direct" effects and "indirect" effects.24 In order to be direct, an action has to
be performed with the intent of effecting the forum state. In contrast, if the
intent is absent, and the objectives of the acting party are limited to activities
within the foreign state, any effects upon the forum state are indirect, and cannot
Only six years later, in
be used as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction.'
26 , Judge Ryan found the
(ICI)
v.
Imperial
Chemical
Industries
United States
law to be "crystal clear: a conspiracy to divide territories, which affects
American commerce, [violates the American antitrust law]. '27 U.S. courts
have used the effects test provided in Alcoa as a basis for jurisdictional
analysis. 28 Moreover, the effects doctrine has been codified in United States
law. Under such codification, if a "substantial, direct, and foreseeable" effect
restraining American trade is found to exist, United States courts can claim
jurisdiction. 9 Both these cases and the codification of the effects doctrine,
however, show a basic misunderstanding as to the competence of the United
States, under internationallaw, to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals for
acts performed outside its national territory.3"

II.

PROBLEMS WITH THE

U.S. APPLICATION OF THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE

There are two basic problems with U.S. courts application of the effects
doctrine. First, the "effects doctrine" lacks support among the community of
nations. Second, American courts have been totally unable to adequately take
into consideration the interests of the nations affected by their exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 1 It is true that a balancing test, supposedly used
to determine the reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction, purports to take
foreign interests into account. This test, however, lacks clear definition both as
to whether the test is binding and as to the manner in which foreign interests are
to be examined. These problems allow the test to be used in an inconsistent
manner, when it is utilized at all.

24

Id. at 441-444.

2 FUGATE,

supra note 1, at 63.

1 100 F.Supp. 504,final order entered 105 F.Supp. 215.
27Id. at 592.

I See, eg., Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of America N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) Section 70,600 at 77,414; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
2 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982 & Supp 1986).
o Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
L. J.638, 643.
1' Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J.INT'L L.
756 (1983).
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A. Problems with the Theory of the Effects Doctrine
The first problem with an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction based
upon the effects doctrine surfaces on a theoretical level, even before a specific
claim of jurisdiction is made. Proponents of the Alcoa approach claim that the
effects test is based on the case of the S.S. Lotus, decided in 1927 by the
Permanent Court of International Justice.32 The other view is that the S.S.
Lotus did not stand for the effects test at all, but instead referred to the principle
of objective territoriality.33 The better view is that the S.S. Lotus stood for the
latter proposition. Objective territoriality, a settled theory of jurisdiction in
international law, refers to the power of a state to take jurisdiction over foreign
nationals for acts committed abroad. The effects doctrine "allows" a nation to
do the same. There is a critical difference, however, in the relationship between
the acts and the effects. In order for a nation to justify an assertion of
jurisdiction under a theory of objective territoriality, the effects felt in the
asserting nation must be a constituent element of the action, without which no
cause of action would have arisen. 4 Under the effects doctrine, however, the
nexus between the action taken abroad and the effects felt domestically is much
weaker: a nation can assert jurisdiction under the effects doctrine over any
action which has a direct effect, above the de minimis line, even when such
effect is not a constituent element of the action.
In the S.S. Lotus,35 the leading case on the issue of whether a state can
assert jurisdiction based on the effects of an action, a French ship travelling in
international waters negligently rammed a Turkish ship. The Permanent Court
of International Justice determined that Turkey had correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the officer on watch aboard the French vessel because the
constituent elements of the action - the negligence on the French ship and the
effect/injury on the Turkish ship - were "legally, entirely inseparable, so much
so that their separation [rendered] the offense non-existent. "". In other words,
if there had been no French negligence, there would have been no Turkish
injury. More importantly, if there had been no injury, there would have been
no negligence, or at least none that would have been legally cognizable.
Foreign nations take a more narrow view of the S.S. Lotus and the
principle of objective territoriality: the principle, of.which the effects doctrine
is a part, was meant to deal only with conduct which is universally considered

32 Case of the

S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.9.

33See Schreiber, supranote 2, at 45.

1 See Haight, supranote 30, at 640.
1 See supra note 32.
36

See supra note 32, at 30.
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a crime.37 As such, violations of American antitrust laws cannot be prosecuted
under this principle, as they are far from being universally considered as crimes.
The commitment of the United States to free trade and competition, however,
is much greater than that of any other nation -- including that of America's
trading partners," and that has led it to stretch the holding of the S.S. Lotus
well beyond its ratio decidendi.
Leaving aside the proposition that the community of nations must regard
the action as justifying an exception to strict territoriality, it is clear that the
"effects doctrine" still falls short of the S.S. Lotus principle: antitrust cases,
especially transnational ones, are too complex to definitively claim that the
allegedly anti-competitive effect was a constituent part of the actions taken.39
For instance, in Laker Airways v. Sabena, World Airlines,' a case that will be
discussed at greater length in the next section of this article, a cartel would have
forced Laker Airways into bankruptcy, even if the American market were not
involved at all. Without the price fixing arrangement there would have been no
injury, but the reverse cannot be said. Had Laker been financially stronger, it
may have weathered the conspiracy without injury. Thus, the price fixing
agreement could have existed without injury to Laker. Although the price fixing
arrangement lead directly to an injury, the existence of an injury was not
necessary to the existence of the arrangement. Thus, the injury was not legally,
entirely inseparable, as it had been in the S.S. Lotus.
The objective territoriality principle is well-settled in international law. But
an attempt to assert jurisdiction over agreements made by foreigners outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, on the grounds that some "effects" have been
felt on United States commerce, is stretching the principle beyond its original
meaning and intent.4 1 Partly because of this, the effects doctrine has been
characterized as the least recognized international jurisdictional principle.4 2
Foreign nations resent the doctrine as applied by the United States because it is
grounded in U.S. municipal law and has no basis for guidance in international
law.43 There have been fewer complaints when Germany or the European
Community have sought to apply the effects doctrine, as these forums must look
to international law once a direct effect has been found, in order to determine

" Griffen, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECo. 137, 138
(1978).

I Marks, State Department Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. &
Eco. 153, 154 (1978). Of special concern to other nations is the treble damages remedy in
American law. Shenefield, supra note 20, at 356.
3 See Haight, supra note 30, at 698.
40 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
41

Jennings, XXXIII BRrr. Y.B. INT'L. L. 148, 175 (1958).

1 See Hawk, supra note 11, at 31-32.
1 See Gerber, supra note 31.
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if they may exercise jurisdiction." Many nations, however, resent even this
modification.
B. Problems with the Application of the Effects Doctrine.
On a more practical level, two types of problems emerge from an exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine. First, the doctrine
does not adequately consider the interests of other nations and does not
recognize any internationally obligated limitations. Second, longer-termed
problems follow, as assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction harm the
international trading system and affect other nations.
1. Fails to Adequately ConsiderForeign Interests.
The major complaint that foreign nations have about the reach of United
States antitrust law is that the law, especially when a private suit is initiated,
does not adequately take into account the interests of the foreign nation.45 The
primary concern of these nations is that, in deciding what is "direct" or
"substantial," a nation's courts will invariably look only to that nation's
interests.46 While "direct" or "substantial" may modify the doctrine, such
modification will only reduce the number of times that extraterritorial
jurisdiction will come into play, and will not help the conflicts that will arise
when jurisdiction is asserted.47 The problem remains that the forum nation's
judge, looking to the forum nation's municipal law, will decide whether the
forum nation will exercise jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most critical primary problem with the United States' exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that, once the American court has determined
the existence of direct and substantial effects, the court needs only to find that
an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. In doing so, the court looks to
domestic policy and law. In fact, existing or developing rules of international
law need not be considered, except to the extent that they form part of U.S.
domestic law.4" The examination of international law ends once the court has
decided that the dictates of the Alcoa test are met. Even this is a cursory
deferment at best, as Alcoa is an American interpretation of international law,
4Id.

I See Meeson, Antitrust JurisdictionUnder Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
783,793-94 (1984). After examining a number of cases involving disputes over the reach of United
States antitrust law, Meeson comes to the conclusion that because nations protest where there are
elements of strict territoriality, but sometimes do not protest when the elements are not present, that
attempts by American courts to take evidence abroad sometimes do and sometimes do not provoke
a dispute, and that the substance of the antitrust law, i.e. treble damages, were not the sole cause
of conflict, "the crux of the matter is adverse effect on foreign interests." Id. at 795.
1 Gerber, supra note 31, at 779.
47Id.

I See Meeson, supra note 45, at 789.
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and does not reflect a rule of international law. Moreover, when a United States

court utilizes the balancing of interests approach, it does so only in the context
of interests which the United States condones.

When an American court

declines jurisdiction on the basis of another nation's interests, it does so only
after determining that the foreign interest meets United States standards.49
One method of determining if an assertion of American jurisdiction is
reasonable is to apply a balancing test. In such a test, the court weighs the
interests of the United States in asserting prescriptive jurisdiction against the
interest of the foreign government involved.'
At some point under this
balancing test, American interests will be so weak, while foreign interests will
be so strong, that adjudication in an American court may be inappropriate.
United States courts, however, have been confused in their attempts to find this
point. In fact, their lack of information on the dictates of foreign law and policy

have generated considerable tension among U.S. trading partners."1
This lack of information has led U.S. courts to rely solely upon domestic
conflict of laws principles and has caused them to find that U.S. interests
outweigh those of the foreign government involved. This, in turn, has led
foreign nations to view American antitrust jurisdiction primarily as an
exportation of intrusive American policy.
One reason why the United States courts do not pay more attention to the
interests of foreign nations when engaged in a balancing test is that the foreign
government itself is not a party to the dispute before the court. Most antitrust
suits are private, generally between two corporations or groups of corporations.
The court weighs the interests of the private parties involved relative only to

I See Maier, supra note 1, at 593. After discussing Timberlane, Mannington Mills and
Westinghouse, Maier comes to the conclusion that,
although in this case the [foreign] interests are identified, they appear to be given
effect principally because they reflect policies that meet with the approval of the US
forum. The result flows not from a true balancing of conflicting governmental
interests but from an evaluation of the substance of the conflicting policies. Taken
together, the thrust of these cases is that we will respect those foreign laws and
policies whose purposes we approve, but not those that we dislike. Judicialapproval
or disapprovalof the foreign nationalpolicies in question was the determiningfactor
(emphasis added).
o In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the Court
examined seven factors: (1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, (2) nationality and
principle place of business of the party, (3) the extent to which a judgement can be expected to be
enforced, (4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those felt
elsewhere, (5) the extent to which the party intended to harm American commerce, (6) the
foreseeability of the effect felt in the United States and (7) the relative importance of the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared to conduct outside the United States.
s' There had been at least two balancing tests used before the Laker court added to the confusion
by declaring that the test was not neither needed nor helpful. Cf. Timberlane with Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit supplemented
the Thuaberlane approach with other factors, including the possible effects on foreign relations of
an assertion of jurisdiction, whether the party censured wbe subject to conflicting obligations,
whether the remedy granted would be acceptable to the United States were a foreign nation to
impose it upon an American defendant, and whether there is a treaty controlling.
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each other. The interests of governments are not directly considered. 52 For
instance, the American court in Laker admitted that the balancing of interests
was not a good solution to the problem, because United States courts had
declined jurisdiction on these grounds only when the United States interest had
been de minimis s3
2. Failsto Recognize InternationalBoundaries.
A second point of contention between the United States and its trading
partners is that the United States takes the view that, in asserting jurisdiction,
there exist no internationally recognized limitations. As James R. Atwood has
put it:
In the absence of treaty constraints, international law recognizes the
prerogative of each sovereign state to regulate conduct within its
territory and the conduct of its nationals outside its territory. Further,
the United States may regulate conduct outside its territory between
non-nationals where that conduct results in effects within the United
States that are direct and substantial. See, e.g., Restatement (Second)
Foreign Relations Law of the United States §18 (1965). Many U.S.
cases in the antitrustfield recognize the legitimacy of this exercise of
extraterritorialjurisdiction.Of course, the principle of comity should
be given due weight in cases involving extraterritorial enforcement.'
It should come as no surprise that foreign nations accuse the United States of
acting contrary to international law, for the United States does not even look at
international law in order to determine whether its assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction violate international law. Instead, it looks to the American
interpretation of international law and to domestic case law supporting this
interpretation.55
3. Affects the Rights of Other Nations

-2 See Maier, supranote 1, at 289.
s Laker, 731 F.2d at 950-51. The Court cited several cases where the court in question had
dismissed because the effects inside the United States were deemed to be insignificant.

I Letter of November 19, 1979 from James R. Atwood, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Dep't
of State to Michael Gadbaw, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Special Trade Representative,
reprintedin 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 667 (1980)(emphasis added).
-s A former Director of Policy Planning of the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice stated that he was surprised that American leadership in the antitrust field had
not been met with the international teamwork that what he perceived as an apparent international
consensus would lead one to expect. See Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust: an American View,
Address to the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, Mar. 12, 1981; See also Pettit & Styles,
supra note 17, at 698. This viewpoint contains an erroneous assumption: the fact that the
international community wishes to protect free trade does not mean that it wishes to utilize the
effects doctrine, treble damages, or the private cause of action as a means to this end.
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Another problem arising from the application of the effects doctrine is that
effects of the same nature against which the United States complains may be felt
in the foreign nation. After all, if a foreign entity performs an action which has
effects in the United States, but is then told that it must pay damages for this
action, such penalty will immediately affect the entity's position in its home
market. This could be seen by the foreign government as a "direct and
substantial effect" of the court's decision in its internal economic affairs.
Indeed, a distinct possibility exists that the effect of U.S. jadicial action on
another nation might be more direct or substantial than the effect of the foreign
entity's action in the United States.56 Therefore, the foreign government would
have the same reason to retaliate against the United States firm which originally
brought the action in the United States court. Moreover, even when parties
legitimately subject themselves to United States antitrust jurisdiction, foreign
reaction centered around the substance of the antitrust laws will undoubtedly
follow.5 7
4. Harms the InternationalSystem.
Perhaps the largest problem associated with assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is that, even when a particular dispute is ultimately settled, an
unacceptable assertion of jurisdiction does long-term damage to the system of
international law and trade. According to a 1987 study conducted by the
International Chamber of Commerce, the growing incidence of countries trying
to apply their national laws outside their territory is harming international
business.5 8 The study showed that the frequency and intensity of conflicts over
jurisdiction have increased in recent years. 9 The disputes over the TransSiberian Pipeline and the Laker suit were cited as two particularly difficult
cases.' The report noted that the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction for
international business is that "[iut creates a climate of commercial and legal
uncertainty, distorts investment and trading decisions, results in unwarranted
costs for international business, and sometimes imposes conflicting legal
requirements on companies. The overall effect is to discourage productive

V. NANDA, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BusINESS TRANSACTIONS §

10.03[1] (1989).

s7 The possibility of a damage award in excess of $1 billion was, in all likelihood, weighing

havily on the minds of the British politicians and judges, as they decided the issues in Laker. Due
to the nature of the claim, the entire judgement could have been enforced against any one of the
defendants, or any combination of the entirety. The British government was faced with the
possibility that British corporations would be "forced" to pay over $1 billion in damages. If this
is not a direct and substantial effect felt in the United Kingdom, one is hard put indeed to imagine
what is needed to constitute such an effect. The jurisdictional basis of the suit brought by Laker
was not really in question, as all the defendants were operating within the territory of the United
States.
I See supra note 9, at 88; Pettit & Styles, supra note 17, at 698.
59

See Saurmann, The Regulation of MultinationalCorporationsand Third World Countries, 11

SOUTH AFRICA Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 71 (1985-86).

' See supra note 9.
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economic activity, including international investment, and ultimately to reduce
employment and economic growth."61
Nevertheless, the United States interest in a well-functioning international
system is not a factor which is usually weighed in the process of determining if
jurisdiction can be legitimately eiercised.62 Once the requirements of the
effects test have been met, and an American court has found it may assume
jurisdiction, the balancing test basically informs the court whether it should take
jurisdiction. The court is then free to make its decision without evaluating the
possible impact such decision may have either on other nations individually or
on the international legal system as a whole.' International law, however, is
the product of an intergovernmental process which reflects the demand,
response, and compromise of co-equals. When a court unilaterally decides what
is internationally permissible, without looking at international law and at the
interests of other affected states to determine whether a legal principle prohibits
the court from taking jurisdiction, it effectively skews this process,' and
predictability in the international market is significantly affected.
Furthermore, a court lacks the ability to weigh long-term goals against
short-term goals.' One such long-term goal involves the maintenance of an
international system reflecting various divisions of authority, which, in turn, by
promoting international trade and general goodwill among nations, would be
A
beneficial to the interests of the community of nations as a whole.'
municipal court, however, generally pursues only short-term goals - its scope
of action is limited to the adjudication of the dispute which is before it. If there
is any domestic societal interest involved, the court will, in all likelihood, act
to protect that interest.67 If any diplomatic problems arise because of the
court's decision, their resolution will be left to diplomats. This balancing of
short-term interests over long-term interests weakens the international system.
The method often has the result of coercing the activities of a foreign entity
performed inside a foreign sovereign's territory."

6Id.

See Maier, supranote 1, at 594. For a discussion of United States Supreme Court decisions
which do emphasize the importance of the international system, see Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdictionat a Crossroads:AnIntersectionbetween Public andPrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM.
J. INT'L L. 280, 303-16 (1982).
at a Crossroads: An Intersectionbetween Public and
1 See Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
Private InternationalLaw, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 299 (1982).
Id. at 317.
"See Rogers supra note 14, at 939, and cases cited therein.
See Maier, supra note 1, at 594.
"See Maier, supranote 63; Rogers supra note 14, at 939.
See Maier, supranote 1, at 594. See also Schrieber, supra note 2, at 51.
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III. REACTIONS BY THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

Foreign reactions to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction have
taken on two basic forms: (1) protests over individual disputes and, more
recently, (2) blocking statutes designed to prevent all unacceptable claims.

Multinational efforts to fight extraterritorial jurisdiction have also been made
through treaties and conventions. The opinion of the international community
was perhaps best stated by the United Kingdom in an aide-memoire to the

Commission of the European Community:
On general principles, substantive jurisdiction in antitrust matters
should only be taken on the basis of either (a) the territorial principle,
or (b) the nationality principle. There is nothing in the nature of
antitrust proceedings which justifies a wider application of these

principles than is generally accepted in other matters; on the contrary,
there is much which calls for a narrower application.69
The effects doctrine was not considered as a permissible basis for an exercise
of jurisdiction.7"

A. Protests Over Specific Cases
Among the most important cases that have generated strong protests from
foreign governments are Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines

(settled out of court prior to trial), the Siberian Pipeline Dispute (ultimately
resolved by political means), and the Matsushita case (judicially resolved).
1. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines

a. Facts of the Case
In 1977, Laker Airways, Ltd., a British corporation, begin offering a lowpriced, no-frills air service between London and New York. The prices offered
by Laker were approximately one-third of the comparable price offered by the
airlines comprising the International Air Transport Association (IATA).71

69 Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The British Protectionof Trading Interests Act,
1980 75 Am J. INT'L L. 261 (1981).
7' Id.. See also Letter by A.J. Mantle, Assistant Secretary, Dep't of Trade, to Dr. E.
Niederleithinger, Vice President of the Bundeskartellamt in Berlin, in which the British Government
expressed its "firm view that for the authorities of one state to assert jurisdiction over the acts of
foreign companies occurring outside its territory on the basis of the effects of such acts within its
territory is not consistent with principles of international law." Reprinted in LV BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 539 (1984).
" The IATA is an organization consisting of the world largest air carriers. The airlines
establish fixed fares at annual meetings, which are then subject to official authorization from the
governments involved. Because the IATA "substantially controlled" the prices of transatlantic
flights, the existence of Laker's low prices threatened the IATA cartelized pricing system. See
Laker, 731 F.2d at 916-17.
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IATA countered by fixing prices at a predatory level in an effort to drive Laker
from the skies.72 In 1981, three airlines dropped ticket prices on their full-

service flights and met Laker's no-service price.73 Allegedly, these three
airlines paid travel agents to divert potential customers away from Laker. Laker
then attempted to reschedule its financing, but Sabena, KLM and other IATA
carriers allegedly pressured Laker's creditors to withhold financing which they

had previously promised. Laker was forced to liquidate.
Through its liquidator, Laker brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the predatory pricing and

subsequent pressure on creditors by the IATA had forced Laker to leave the
transatlantic market.74 At this point, the foreign defendants obtained an
interlocutory injunction from the British High Court of Justice which prevented
Laker from proceeding against them in the American courts. 7"
Although the immediate issue was the initiation by Laker of an antitrust suit
in the United States, the real objection of the United Kingdom was the reach of
the United States jurisdiction.76 The British government felt the lawsuit was
penal in nature and that rights granted to the United Kingdom and to British
airlines under the Bermuda 2 Agreement?' were being undermined.78 The

purpose of-a regime of bilateral agreements regulating international aviation is
to give some assurances of predictability and fair dealing.

From the Britsh

perspective, the United States' undertaking a unilateral action such as Laker
undermined this very foundation.79 British sovereignty was being threatened,
as the United States was attempting to control actions of a British corporation
in Great Britain, thus effectively taking the control of this corporation out of
British hands.'

7 Once this was accomplished, the IATA apparently planned to raise its prices back to the preLaker level. Id.
7 Pan American Airlines, Trans World Airlines and British Airways.
71 The defendants in this suit were Pan American World Airlines, Trans World Airlines,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., Mcdonnell Douglas Finance Corp., British Airlines, British Caledonian
Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair. Damages were alleged at $350 million, which if trebled would
amount to $10.5 billion.
75Laker, 731 F.2d at 918.
76

See Rogers, supranote 14, at 958.

77

Agreement Relating to Air Services, Feb. 11, 1946, United States-United Kingdom, 60 Stat.
1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507.
1 Letter from the United Kingdom Solicitor's Office of the Department of Trade and Industry
to Pan American's London solicitors, December 19, 1984, reprinted in LVI BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
481 (1984).
1 Speech by A.I. Aust, at the Third International Civil Aviation Authority Conference in
Montreal, October 21, 1985, reprintedin LVI BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 504-05 (1985).
1 See Pan Am Letter, supra note 78.
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Following this temporary setback, Laker filed another antitrust suit in the

United States against KLM and Sabena, who had not been named as defendants
in the original action. This action was consolidated with the first, and an
injunction was issued preventing the American defendants from taking any action
in a foreign court which would impair the jurisdiction of the United States court.
Subsequently, the British High Court of Justice overturned the injunction
previously requested by the original defendants on grounds that the United States
action did not violate British sovereignty."1 The British government then
invoked the British blocking statute on the grounds that the United States suit

Pursuant to this order, all
threatened to harm British trading interests.'
entities conducting business within the United Kingdom were prohibited from
complying with any measures arising out of Laker's American lawsuit.
KLM and Sabena, who had been enjoined from seeking foreign relief,

appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They asserted
that the injunction violated their right to a parallel proceeding in a foreign
forum, undermined the international principle of comity by interfering with
foreign judicial proceedings, and hampered the United Kingdom from exercising
its right to apply British law to a British subject." The Court of Appeals
affirmed the injunction on the ground that the British rulings were not intended
to protect British jurisdiction and interests but were instead meant to deny

jurisdiction to the United States courts. Thus, the court ruled that the British
proceedings were not deserving of comity.
In the interim, Laker had appealed the injunction prohibiting Laker from
pursuing its antitrust claims in the United States to the House of Lords. The

House of Lords ruled that no valid reason to restrain Laker from pursuing these
claims existed. Two grounds were dispositive of both appeals: (1) if Laker's
allegations could be proven, there was a cause of action under United States
antitrust law, and (2) there was no similar cause of action under British common
law.s Because all defendants were legitimately subject to United States law
and because the United States was the only forum which could hear the entire

SI British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [19831 W.L.R. 545, 549.

8 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 Ch. 11. The statute allows the English Secretary
of State to require business entities performing operations in the United Kingdom to refuse to
comply with foreign judicial orders, including requests for discovery.
' In a letter from the Solicitor to the Department of Trade and Industry to Laker's London
Solicitor, Messrs. Durrant Piesse, on December9, 1983, the position of the British government was
succinctly laid out: "In the Secretary of State's view it would be unacceptable and an invasion of
the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United Kingdom, unjustified by international law,"
if United States domestic policies were to be enforced by resort to penal sanctions - such as treble
damages - when a British national inside British territory was acting pursuant to British law, simply
because those actions were against United States law. Reprinted in LV BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 540
(1983). This same letter explained that HM Government felt the Laker dispute would be better
resolved as a matter of intergovernmental negotiations, rather than by the court systems.
s4 Laker, 731 F.2d at 915, 921. See also Rogers, supra note 14, at 945.
8 [1985] A.C. 80.
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case, if the case was to be heard at all, the House of Lords concluded that it
should be heard in the United States.' There was thus a recognition that the
substance of the American law would permit a cause of action and that the
United States could gain in personam jurisdiction over all the parties. This was
not necessarily an admission that the United States' basis for finding subject
matter jurisdiction was acceptable uhider international law.
Some criticism of the United Kingdom's position has been levelled on
grounds that the UK was not protesting on grounds of international law, but
rather on domestic law. In a letter to a private citizen who had requested
information, however, the British Overseas Trade Board wrote: "The [United
States Export Administration Act of 1985] like the [predecessor] 1979 Act, is
extraterritorial in nature

. .

. The United Kingdom government has formally

registered its disappointment and concern that the extraterritorial provisions
which are in our view inconsistent with international law have been retained..
187

Later, in response to questions on United States antitrust laws applicable
to civil aviation, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
wrote that the United Kingdom was of the view that when the activities of
airlines were authorized and regulated in accordance with an international
agreement, domestic laws cannot be used to constrain or regulate those
activities, except to the extent specifically delineated in the agreement or
necessary for the effectuation of the agreement. 8 As Sir Michael Havers,
then-Attorney General of the United Kingdom, elaborated: "There is ...a deep

sense of dismay over the actions of the United States Justice Department in
setting up a grand jury investigation of the Laker collapse . . . American

extensions of jurisdiction have been inching forward, and I think it is a very
dangerous development."'
b. The Problems with Laker
The Laker court itself set the stage for the primary problem: the effects
doctrine has virtually no limits. According to the Court, territorial jurisdiction
arises from the "prerogative of a nation to control and regulate activities within

The House of Lords ruled that "[f]or an English court to enjoin the claimant from having
access to that foreign court is, in effect, to take upon itself a one-sided jurisdiction to determine the
claim upon the merits in his favour." Id.
87Letter by British Overseas Trade Board, October 23, 1985, reprintedin LVI BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 480-81 (1985). See also Letter from United Kingdom Solicitor's Office of the Department
of Trade and Industry to Pan American's London solicitors, December 19, 1984, reprintedin LVI
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 481 (1984); HC Debs., vol. 88, Written Answers, col. 624: December 11,
1985, reprintedin LVI BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 483 (1985).
1 HC Debs., vol. 88, Written Answers, col. 624: December 11, 1985, reprintedin LVI BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 483 (1985).

1 N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1983, at D1, col. 3, D2, col. 5.
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its boundaries . . . an essential element of sovereignty. "I Thus, conduct
outside the territory of a state which has effects inside the territory may be

controlled by the state, for the same reason that conduct within the state which
may have effects outside the state may be controlled.91 This, however, is the
exception that swallows the rule: by their very definition, all transnational

actions have some sort of effect within the territory of at least two nations, and
by allowing any nation which feels a self-determined substantial and direct effect
to take jurisdiction over the entire transaction, the concept of territoriality ceases
to exist.92
Furthermore, the Laker Court did not even attempt to take foreign interests

into account. The interests of the foreign governments were strong indeed, as
the European airlines involved were heavily state-subsidized and operated in an
anticompetitive atmosphere. Due to the nature of Laker's claim, the entire
judgement, were one to be entered, could be enforced against any of the
defendants. This judgement would have been in the area of one billion dollars.
Had Laker pursued such a course of action, instead of settling out of court, one
or more of these airlines could easily have gone bankrupt, with serious effects
upon the subsidizing nation. Although free trade is the rule in the United States,
European governments feel compelled to regulate and subsidize various
industries. Yet, because the Court decided "there is no evidence that interest
balancing represents a rule of international law,"I foreign interests were not

examined.
This leads into a second problem with Laker. Although other United States

Courts of Appeals had engaged in balancing tests, the Laker Court declined to
do so. By disposing of the balancing test, the Court was able to take virtually
any action it felt necessary. There were, the Court felt, no internationally

recognized boundaries to any remedy which might be fashioned. Had the Court
reached the merits of the case, the European airlines may have been faced with
conflicting duties: conduct their home nations allowed, encouraged, or required
versus a mandate from the United States that this conduct have no effect on the

United States.
' Laker, 731 F.2d at 921.
9 Id., at 921-22.
92 If a state were allowed to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts by foreign nationals,
simply on grounds that these actions affected that state, there is practically no limit on the exercise
of jurisdiction. See Haight, supra note 30, at 643. In many countries a highly competitive
economy is considered to be wholly incompatible with that nation's well-being. For one nation to
say that another nation must change its economic policy simply because the latter's policy directly
effects its trade is reduced to an absurdity if one takes this to its logical conclusion: because the
United States trades with the entire world, any action will effect US trade at some point, thus
American antitrust laws are applicable to everyone. See Claudy, Sherman Anti-Trust Law:
Applicability to Foreign Commerce, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 821, 825 n.25 (1952) ("... [lit is difficult
to imagine any association of even potential unestablished competitors that might not produce, from
within or without the United States, a proscribed effect upon United States export or import
trade.").
I Laker, 731 F.2d at 950.
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What, then, is the United States position as to interest balancing and
conflicting duties? Will interests be balanced? If not, does the defendant have
any defense for anti-competitive conduct performed abroad, even if this conduct
was consistent with the law of the place of performance? There is grave
uncertainty as to what American law is on these points, and this acts as a
disincentive to do business with the United States. The uncertainty of American
law means that no foreign actor will be able to perform an action without
wondering if it will be hailed into an American court. The fact that American
law is capable of putting conflicting duties upon an entity is enough to keep that
entity as far from United States commerce as possible.
Finally, the effects of this case going to judgment would have been farreaching. By awarding a billion dollar remedy to Laker, the Court would have
given the airlines the choice of either (1) paying the money, or (2) removing
themselves from the United States market in the hope that this would also
remove them from in personam jurisdiction and enforcement of the judgement.
Had some of the airlines chosen the latter route, the ones staying in the
American market would have been forced to pay the entire amount. Either
option would have had effects in another country. For instance, had Lufthansa
been forced to bear the brunt of paying the judgment, it would probably have
gone bankrupt. Given the level of subsidization of most European airlines, this
could easily have had a negative effect on the government supporting the airline.
2. The Dispute Over the Trans-SiberianPipeline Contracts.
In the Trans-Siberian Pipeline dispute, the United States, in an effort to
impede construction of the pipeline, attempted to force foreign subsidiaries of
United States firms, and anyone using American equipment, to break all pipeline
construction contracts with the Soviet Union. 4 The European nations bitterly
protested what they felt was an impermissible assertion of United States
regulation.9" In an aide-memoire to the Department of Commerce, they
soundly condemned the United States action as contrary to internationally
accepted principles of jurisdiction, an encroachment upon their sovereignty, and
inconsistent with agreements professed to have been reached at the Versailles
Summit.96 Individual states then moved to retaliate by usage of their blocking
statutes.

The basis of their argument was clear: a company registered and
incorporated in Europe, doing business there, employing a European workforce,
using manufacturing equipment of European design, and using European

9 See Maier, supra note 1, at 583.
9 See Legal Serv. of the Comm'n of the European Communities, European Communities:
Comments on the U.S. Regulation ConcerningTradewith the U.S.S.R., reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 891
(1982). See also Maier, supra note 1, at 583.
9 See Shenefield, supra note 20, at 352. The end result of this problem was that after the
intense reaction of the foreign nations, the United States decided not to go forward with its plans.
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material would have been prohibited from carrying out their existing contracts
simply because they were owned by a United States company.' Although the
basis for the U.S. jurisdiction was apparently nationality, the same can be said
about territorial jurisdiction under the effects test.
3. The Matsushita Case
In Matsushita an antitrust suit was brought in U.S. District Court against
Japanese television manufacturers. The manufacturers had allegedly entered
agreements to set high prices in the Japanese market, while prices on exports
into the American market were set at a low level in order to drive American
producers out of the U.S. market. Any loss temporarily sustained would be
covered by the high profits in Japan and would eventually be made up once
these manufacturers controlled the United States market and raised prices. 98
The agreements were supposedly government-ordered and were an essential part
of Japanese trade policy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) sent, through the Japanese ambassador, a statement clarifying its role in
the policies involved. MITI, in fact, would have unilaterally controlled
television export had the companies involved resisted entering into the
agreements at issue. Despite this, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit found it had jurisdiction because the agreement was intended to
and did have an impact on American commerce.
Noticeably absent from the Third Circuit opinion was any application of the
ManningtonMills balancing test, supposedly binding on the Court. By ignoring
this precedent, the Court was able to disregard the monumental conflicts
between U.S. antitrust law and Japanese law and policy, even though the
Japanese government expressly asked the Court not to question its policies. 99
The Court also ignored the suggestions made by the United States Department
of State, as well as by the Japanese government, that the court consider the
effect which an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this particular case
would have. The Matsushita case provoked an angry response by the offended
Japanese government, which felt that its sovereignty had been violated. By
unilaterally deciding that price agreements executed in Japan, under Japanese
law, violated the United States Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court was, in effect,
ruling that a foreign government's action, performed within its own territory,
violated American law.

Speech by Sir Michael Havers, Attorney General of the United Kingdom, to the American
Bar Association (1983), reprinted in LVI BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 418 (1985).
11 In reJapaneseElec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238,251, rev'd sub nom Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Zenith's contentions were ultimately dismissed. However, the dismissal was based upon the holding
of the United States Supreme Court that Zenith had not proven a direct and substantial effect upon
American commerce. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1354 and note 6.
' Matsushita, 723 F.2d at 306.
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B. The Emergence of Blocking Statutes

In reacting to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdictions, foreign
governments have taken a variety of legislative steps. A number of blocking
statutes have sprung up, both in developing and developed nations, in direct
response to the application of national competition or antitrust laws to activities

conducted by foreign nationals acting outside the territory of the asserting
state." The United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980,
which

represents

the

"high

water

mark

of

English

jurisdictional

protectionism,""'° is one of the most controversial and most used blocking
statutes, but many other nations also have such statutes. 1"

Each statute is

different, but the common thread running through them is thai each protects a
nation's sovereignty and its corporations from foreign attempts at extraterritorial
jurisdiction.1 3 These "blocking statutes" have the general effect of refusing
to enforce United States requests for production of documents located within the
territory of the "blocking" nation, and of preventing the enforcement of
American judgements."°

The former has the practical effect of preventing the

normal "trial by document" antitrust suit." 5 The latter type of statutes, in
addition to preventing the enforcement of American judgements, often feature
a "clawback" provision. Such a provision either does not recognize treble
damages claimed against a national entity, or allows the national entity to bring
100MARKE & SAMIE, ANTITRUST AND RESTRicTWvE BUsINESS PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION ix (1983).
101 See Pettit & Styles, supra note 17, at 701.

1o2See, e.g., the Combines Investigation Act 1923, as amended 1976 (Canada); Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976 and Foreign Antitrust Judgments
(Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979 (Australia); Protection of Businesses Act, no. 99 of 1978,
as amended by Protection of Businesses Amendment Act, No. 114 of 1979- (South Africa); Wet
Economish Mededinging (Economic Competition Act) of June 28, 1956 as amended (the
Netherlands); Code of Civil Procedure, Article 249, Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 351,352
and Act (No. 488) of July 24, 1980 (Italy); Law No. 680678 relating to the communication of
commercial and other documents and information to foreign individuals and legal entities as
amended in 1980 (France); Law relating to the Regulation of Maritime and Air Transport of March
27, 1969 as amended, June 21, 1976 (Belgium).
Japan has also considered such legislation. In February, 1983, the United States Internal
Revenue Service obtained a court order compelling the Toyota Corporation to produce certain
documents needed for a tax investigation. The Japanese Deputy Director General of the North
American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs related the Japanese government's position
to the Diet. Stating that the government took the view that this order for submission was in effect
tantamount to the seizure of evidence by foregn prosecutors, he emphasized the fact that this was
nothing more thatn an exercise of the public power of the United States inside the territory of Japan.
As the Japanese felt this was inconsistent with principles of International law, a note verbale was
given to the United States. After stating again that the United States was "rather blatantly"
resorting to such actions as are contratry to international law, he concluded that the only way to
combat United States assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction was to adopt strong affirmative
counter-measures. Mintues of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives (Diet),
98th Session No. 3, (25 March 1983), at 8-9.
11 For an excellent discussion on various blocking statutes see Pettit & Styles, supra note 17.
101See Rogers, supra note 14, at 932; Pettit & Styles, supra note 17, at 699.
103See Rogers, supra note 14, at 932.
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suit in the national court to recoup any damages lost in the American court
which are above the amount of actual damages suffered. These provisions have
the effect of converting an American punitive award into a compensatory
one. 106

Violation of a blocking statute generally results in criminal liability in the
blocking nation's courts. Foreign nations view this as the most effective method
of deterring assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Even though this approach
is often combative and is not designed to lower international tensions,
reasonableness on this issue appears practically useless."'0
As Viscount
Dilhorne of the English House of Lords has stated,

For many years now the United States has sought to exercise
jurisdiction over foreigners in respect to acts done outside the
jurisdiction of that country. This is not in accordance with
international law and has led to legislation on the part of other states,
including the United Kingdom, designed to protect their nationals
from criminal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to
jurisdiction by those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion
of sovereignty.' 08
Most of the blocking statutes go beyond just the antitrust field, but all were
designed primarily to protect against the broad reach of United States antitrust
legislation." ° Among these statutes, the United Kingdom's Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980 has been called "aremarkable response to United
States longarm jurisdiction and
represents the high water mark of English
'

jurisdictional protectionism."

As such, it deserves some special attention

as an example of an effective blocking statute. This act, invoked during the
Laker dispute, gives the British Secretary of State the authority to:
(1) require that entities doing business in the United Kingdom cease
compliance with designated foreign orders,
(2) prevent British courts from complying with foreign requests for
documents or discovery orders and

106 See Rogers, supra note 14, at 933 (specifically referring to the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, ch 11 § 6).
"0
10

See Shenefield, supra note 20, at 352.
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, [1978] A.C. 547, 631.

109 See Marks, supra note 38, at 153-54; Lowe, supra note 69; Toms, The French Response to
The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 Imr'L LAw. 585 (1981).

"0 See Pettit and Styles, supra note 17, at 701.
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(3) forbid the enforcement of any foreign antitrust or treble damages
awards. ll

Furthermore, the Act provides that no judgement for multiple damages can
be enforced either at common law. or by registration pursuant to statute." 2
This, in fact, allows a qualifying defendant, broadly defined to include almost
any entity having significant contacts with the United Kingdom, to recover from
a person notwithin the normal jurisdiction of the British courts any part of a
foreign judgement paid to such person which was not purely compensatory. "13
The Act was expressly designed to allow the United Kingdom to protect the
interests of entities inside the United Kingdom from the application of laws,
orders, and regulations of another nation. This concern was prompted by the
abrogation by the United States of British treaty rights." 4
C. MultilateralEfforts To Combat U.S. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
1. The Hague Evidence Convention
An example of the multinational efforts made by foreign nations to curb
U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction can be seen in the reservations
made pursuant to Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention." 5 The
Convention gives a mechanism for compelling pre-trial discovery from defiant
litigants in transnational cases by requiring parties to the treaty to honor a Letter
of Request from abroad seeking the production of specified documents. This
obligation has only a few narrow exceptions. Chief among these is Article 23,
under which member states may enter a reservation that they "will not execute
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries." 1 6 Of the 21 states that are

t British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11; Pettit and Styles, supra note 17,
at 702; Rogers, supra note 14, at 958.
112British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, § 5. Seejalso Pettit and Styles, supranote
17, at 705.
113

British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, § 6.

Press Release by the British Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Transport,
June 24, 1983, reprintedin LIV BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 484 (1983). See also H.C. Debs. vol.37
Written Answers, col. 548, February 25, 1983: "We have made it quite clear that we regard the
application of [United States] laws to companies registered and doing business in the United
Kingdom as quite unjustified and contrary to international law." Reprinted in LIV BRIT.Y.B. INT'L
L. 483 (1983). When submitting the Bill to Parliament, the then-Secretary of State for Trade
clearly stated that what the British government was seeking was to protect British trading interests
from the application of United States antitrust laws. LIII BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 451 (1982).
I Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
6
11
Id. Art. 23.
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party to the treaty,117 only three, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States
have not entered such a reservation. This evidences a basic unwillingness upon
the part of the community of nations to have their nationals successfully hailed
into an American court.
2. Accord between Canada and Australia
A recent exchange of notes between Canada and Australia provided a
mechanism for cooperation between the two nations in the event a third nation
attempted to apply its laws extraterritorially. If such an attempt would place
conflicting duties on either Canadian businesses in Australia or Australian
businesses in Canada, the host country would notify the other. Thus, the two
nations could more effectively combat the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
by another nation.
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The international community has yet to fully develop rules of jurisdiction
in order to accommodate both the interests of the state within whose territory the
action occurs as well as the interests of the affected nations."1 8 Since the
United States is not likely to abandon the use of the effects doctrine anytime in
the foreseeable future, the solution lies in minimizing the conflicts.
A. IntergovernmentalNegotiations
The correct means by which to resolve conflicting claims of jurisdiction is
intergovernmental negotiation, not a unilateral judicial decision.'1 9 Trade
disputes are best settled by intergovernmental negotiations, for they involve
policy decisions which should not be left to ad hoc, private party litigation.' 20
When one nation clashes with another over which nation will apply its laws,
each nation feels that it is acting in its best interests. Quite often, matters of
grave national concern are at stake. In a setting such as this, the only solution
is either for one side to capitulate totally, or for both sides to compromise. The
latter option can be achieved only by governmental negotiations performed in
light of international principles, with both sovereigns taking account of the
interests of the other.'12
The conflict over the Soviet pipeline is a good
7

Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
11 See Gerber, supra note 31, at 756.
119 See Maier, supra note 1, at 581.
"0 See Griffen, supra note 37, at 147.
121 See

Gerber, supra note 31, at 583.
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illustration of this type of negotiation. When the United States realized the harm
that was being done to its trade relationships, it decided that the goodwill of the
European nations, collectively as well as individually, was more important than
seeing the pipeline contracts broken."
This was accomplished through
intergovernmental negotiations. A situation such as this allows the nations
involved to weigh their long-term goals against their short-term goals.
An example- of a mechanism designed to establish successful
intergovernmental negotiations when a dispute over jurisdiction in antitrust
matters 'arise is the recent United States-Australia Accord on Antitrust
Enforcement. 1 Under this agreement, the United States agrees to act as a
quasi-amicuscuriae for the Australian government when a private antitrust suit
threatens to interfere with Australian national interests. In return, the Australian
government has promised not to trigger its blocking statutes simply because the
American court seeks to procure discovery of documents located in
Australia.124 This alternative is especially plausible because the mechanism
required for its implementation - diplomacy - is already in place.

Instead of

leaving the problems to private parties to resolve, diplomats can begin the
negotiations.
B. Modification of Existing Law

Another method of possibly avoiding open conflict, instead of either
granting or rejecting jurisdiction, would be to modify the substantive domestic
law when an international problem arises." z An example of this would be for
a United States court to take jurisdiction, but, assuming the plaintiff wins, award
only compensatory damages. This would have the effect of upholding the
policies regarding competition, which is of primary concern to the United States,
while at the same time removing a potential point of conflict with other
interested nations. Another example of such a method would be for courts to
weigh interests much as they do now under the Second Restatement on Conflicts
of Law, but instead of this being a binding decision, the judicial determination
would be subject to review by the nation's diplomats."2 This would have the
effect of allowing the diplomats to sort out the foreign policy questions after
consultation with interested nations, and possibly avoid the problems which
would arise with a unilateral assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In the case of the United States, this should be done by amending the
remedies section of the Sherman Antitrust and Clayton Acts. Likewise, the

12Id.
'1

43 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1071 at 36 (July 1, 1982).

124

Id.

12sSee

Meeson, supra note 45, at 798.

126See Maier, supranote 1, at 595.
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jurisdictional statute, 15 U.S.C. 6(a), could be amended to conform with the
latter suggestion. Given the present language of the statutes, the court system's
duty to adjudicate issues without rendering advisory opinions, and the long
history of statutory interpretation, a court would have difficulty interpreting the
current statutes in the suggested manner. Alternatively, the United States courts
could adopt an approach such as the one taken by Germany or the European
Community. Though not enough time has passed to accurately gauge the
reaction to the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp Case,
the German technique, employed for manyyears,
has provoked much less
l
criticism than has the United States method.
A change such as this could be accomplished by Congress, or possibly the
courts. The courts, however would find the changes more difficult to make than
Congress. As noted above, a court adjudicating a private dispute is not the
correct forum for either making fundemental changes in the law or for settling
international problems. The thrust of all this is to move away from the
American methodology currently used in personam/subject matter jurisdictional
theory. Instead, a less theoretical and more functional system-dictated approach
should be utilized. In this approach, the interests of other nations are involved,
and the decisions of whether and to what extent to enforce United States law
would be up to the branches which are best able to decide such matters. If new
laws need to be promulgated or existing ones changed, this should be done.
This approach is only an alternative to the intergovernmental negotiation
approach, as an assertion of jurisdiction would still be a unilateral decision.
However, the changes in the law could be coupled with the formation of an
international tribunal, as discussed below. The result would be a lessening in
tension between the United States and its trading partners.
1. The Effects Doctrine as Applied by Germany
The German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) provides that international
jurisdiction is based on the territory of the state where the act took place. 28
Even though an act can "take place" in the territory where the consequences of
an action occurred, extraterritorial jurisdiction will not lie unless the
consequences are an integral and inseparable part of the complained of action;
that is, in a case where, absent the consequences, the act would not be
completed.
Under German law, extraterritorial application of domestic Ilaw requires a
two-step inquiry. The first level of inquiry is whether the effects of an action
are felt within German territory.'29 This is broader than the American
application of the effects doctrine: under Alcoa and subsequent legislation, the

12 See Gerber, supra note 31.
128

Article 32, German Code of Civil Procedure.

29 Law Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) § 98(2).
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effects must be direct and substantial. This aberration can be explained by
reference to the timing of the passage of the GWB in 1957. The GWB was the
first true German antitrust statute; as such, the German legislature had no
experience with the problems extraterritorial jurisdiction caused. The main
source of guidance was Alcoa, but even this was somewhat misleading. Even
though"the United States had been slowly expanding its antitrust jurisdiction in
the twelve years since Alcoa, the extremely broad assertions of United States
jurisdiction dnd its attendant repercussions had not developed at that time.130
Now, in order to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, a German court must find
that, in addition to the effects being direct and substantial, the effects must
of the specific statute which declares the
interfere with the protective purposes
3
action to be anticompetitive.' 1
The German Kammergericht first ruled in the Cigarettes case that the
efects doctrine alone is not sufficient to satisfy the dictates of international
law. "32
' Thus, if a German court finds that the requisite effects were felt in
Germany, a second inquiry must be made to determine if international law
prohibits the exercise of German jurisdiction. This question is much more
serious to German judges than it is to their American counterparts, as the
German Constitution expressly provides that general international law is binding
on both the legislature and the courts. 33 To determine whether international
law prohibits an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the German courts use
a balancing test, much as American courts do. The German balancing test,
however, is significantly different from that used in the United States. In
Germany, the international principles of nonintervention and abuse of
jurisdiction are looked at in a legal context, rather than in a political context.
This means a judge is required to apply a principle of law and reach a legal
conclusion."IM In the United States, the balancing of interests does not take
place in a strictly legal context, but is grounded instead in principles of comity,
which have intrinsic political overtones.1 3' A further difference is that while
American courts have no binding guide by which to weigh the interests of other
nations, 1 6 such a standard exists for German judges. When applying the
principle of nonintervention, the interests of Germany will outweigh foreign
interests, unless the foreign interests "significantly outweigh" them. The abuse

'3

See Gerber, supra note 31, at 759-61.

"' Id. at 781.
132

Id. at 775.

133Id.

at 760, Grundgesetz, Art. 25.

134 Id. at 781.
135Id.

13 A list which contain various interests, both domestic and foreign, to be weighed exists.
However, there is no objective guide to tell a judge what weight to give to which interest. See
Mannington Mills and Timberlane, supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. This leads to
inconsistency, and then to uncertainty in the market. See Gerber, supra note 31, at 781.
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of jurisdiction principle will be triggered only if injuries to the foreign state are
"crassly disproportionate" to German interests. 1"
Other nations do not react as vehemently when Germany makes claims of
extraterritorial jurisdiction as they do when the United States makes such
assertions. This is due to the public international law approach of Germany's
two-part analysis. Germany has expressly recognized that external restraints
exist which limit the use of the effects doctrine, while the United States
apparently has not yet reached this realization. The critical problem when the
United States attempts to balance the interests of foreign nations is that it looks
to domestic law for guidance. It does not purport to apply a rule of international
law. Foreign governments are thus very dubious when the United States claims
their interests are being weighed.138
In the prohibition order of March 3, 1989, concerning the merger of Linde,
a German corporation, and the Kaye organization, a British company with a
German subsidiary, the German Federal Cartel Office faced the issue of the
extraterritorial reach of German merger control legislation.'3 9 The Decision
Making Board concluded as a threshold matter that Linde held a dominant
position in the German forklift market. Normally, this would have prevented
Linde from acquiring another company operating in the same market, unless the
merger had procompetitive effects which outweighed the anticompetitive effects.
The Kaye Organization operated in several European countries, including
Germany; thus, acquisition of Kaye would seem an impermissible strengthening
of Linde's dominant position. The Decision Making Board, however, allowed
the merger, prohibiting only the acquisition of the German subsidiary. This was
allowed, even though the gain of the non-German business of Kaye was
considered to strengthen Linde's dominant position in the German market. In
the opinion of the Board, Germany, under public international law, had no
authority to prohibit the acquisition of a foreign company. Linde may be a step
towards the abandonment of the effects principle by Germany, since under that
theory, Germany would have had jurisdiction over an acquisition having
anticompetitive effects within Germany."
2. Assumption of ExtraterritorialJurisdictionby the European Community
In the Wood Pulp case, forty-one producers of bleached sulfate wood pulp
and two trade associations, all non-members of the European Community,
petitioned the European Court of Justice to revoke a ruling by the European

13

See Gerber, supra note 31, at 782.

138Id.

"" See Regional Developments: Antitrust Law: German Antitrust Law, 24 INT'L LAW. 265

(1990).
140Id.

at 266.
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Commission. 41 The Commission had determined that practices engaged in by
the applicants were in violation of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission had used the effects doctrine to determine that it had jurisdiction
over the allegedly anticompetitive practices. Most of the applicants contested
the right of the Commission to apply the European competition laws
extraterritorially, focusing on the lack of territorial connection between their
practices and the European Community in an attempt to have the Court apply the
principle of strict territoriality.
Th&Court, however, declined to accept either of the proposed principles
as controlling. The Court reasoned that nothing in the Treaty prohibited its
application to entities located outside the territorial boundaries of the European
Community. 142 The Court then noted that to apply a strict principle of
territoriality would have the result of giving "undertakings an easy means of
evading those prohibitions." 143 Ultimately, the Court determined the practices
were subject to EC jurisdiction because the "decisive factor" of an allegedly
anticompetitive act is "the place where it is implemented. " " Although the
Court did not elaborate upon the meaning of the term "implemented," its
analysis of the case sheds some light upon the question. First, competition
within the EC is restricted when a supplier performs an action in the EC
involving the price which Will ultimately be charged to their customers inside the
EC. 145 Second, in dismissing the claim against a U.S. trade association, the
Court held that the association neither engaged in the "manufacturing, selling,
or distribution" of the product, nor did it play "a separate role in the
implementation" of the agreement.1 46 A third passage described the
jurisdiction of the Community over practices which "directly, intentionally, and
appreciably affect competition within the Community ....
,1147 Taken
together, these passages suggest the reach of European competition law will be
based somewhere between the two extremes of strict territoriality and a strict
application of the effects doctrine. In order for extraterritorial jurisdiction to
arise in the European Community, there must be direct, intentional and
appreciable effects on European trade and an action actually conducted on
European soil. 4 ' Effects on Community trade and, additionally, the foreign
entity must have some direct connection with the anticompetitive action. This
141 A. AhIstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, [1987-1988 transfer Binder, Common Mkt. Rep
(CCH) 14,491 at 18606-07 [hereinafter, Wood Pulp].

142 Wood Pulp, 14,491 at 18,611-12.
143 Id.
144Id.

145 Id.
'4

id. at 18,613.

"4

Id. at 18,605.

141For a more detailed discussion of Wood Pulp, see Vollmer & Sandage, Casenote:The Wood
Pulp Case, 23 INT'L LAW. 721 (1989).
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is what separates the jurisdictional holding of Wood Pulp from the effects
doctrine. In order for the United States to assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction,
there need not be an anticompetitive action actually occurring on American soil.
C. A Balancing Test Performedby an InternationalTribunal
A third possible method of avoiding open conflicts would be for the United
States to avoid, or at least minimize, the application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction of national laws. One method of doing this is through the emerging
jurisdictional rule of reason. This rule would requirethat a nation refrain from
extraterritorial application of its laws when to apply those laws would
unreasonably intrude into the legitimate interests of other states. 149 At least
one scholar has attempted to formulate a balancing test based on international
law. 5 According to this rule, a state would be prohibited from assuming
jurisdiction over antitrust matters if the "regulatory interests it is pursuing are
outweighed by the interests of one or more foreign states likely to be seriously
injured by those measures. "" This rule, however, is inadequate by itself, as
it still gives no binding guidance, and a domestic forum applying the rule will
still give paramount weight to its own interests. Even though the rule states that
domestic and foreign interests should carry equal weight, in reality judges are
a product of the system of which they are a part. A domestic interest which to
a totally neutral observer may seem trivial may be of extreme importance to a
domestic court. Thus a domestic court will, in all likelihood, not be able to
weigh domestic and foreign interests equally. On the positive side, this is a step
in the right direction. The bias problem could be best solved by allowing an
international arbitral tribunal to conduct the balancing. 152 Questions by
domestic courts could be submitted to this tribunal, which would render binding
13
opinions on the existence and interpretation of rules of international law.
In this manner, the interests of all concerned states would be weighed equally
and fairly.
VI. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, international law is binding on all actors upon
the international stage. One of the most important bases of this body of law is
what is known as customary international law - that is, what nations do. What
nations do, when faced with an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on
the effects doctrine, is protest. Nations protest, claiming that such assertions are
contrary to international law, because of the problems, both theoretical and
'4

See Growing Incidence of ExtraterritorialityThreatens InternationalBusiness, ICC Says,

International Trade Reporter (BNA), Sept. 30, 1987, at 88.
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practical, that arise when one nation attempts to enforce its laws inside another
nation's borders. For various reasons, only one nation asserts jurisdiction based
on a strict application of this principle. This *nation should not be allowed to
justify this assertion on grounds that it is accepted in international law: the
actions of all other nations belie its position. That nation, in the interests of
international trade, should modify itsposition. Inter-governmental negotiations
can begin the very nqext time a dispute arises. Substantive changes in American
and internati6nal law may take longer. But in the interests of the well-being of
an ever-more interdependent world economy, these changes should be made.

